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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
C & J INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a corporation, A. ROBERT
COLLINS and GLADE N.
JAMES,
PlaintiffsRespondents,
vs.
EDWARD O. BAILEY and
RUTH c. BAILEY, his wife,
Case No. 16648

DefendantsAppellants.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a contract dispute.

It revolves around the

operation and effect of a particular clause of a real estate
contract between the parties to this action.

That clause

is Paragraph 3(a) and it reads as follows:
In the event Buyer desires to sell or assign,
transfer or convey Buyer's rights under this
contract or Buyer's interest in said premises,
then and in that event, the Buyer must pay
in full the outstanding balance on the contract prior to said transaction.
It is the position of Plaintiffs-Respondents that
l) the terms of Paragraph 3(a) have not been violated, and
2) the facts of this case do not operate to accelerate payments
under the contract to the contract seller (Appellants).
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Appellants contend 1) that the facts trigger
acceleration of all payments under the contract, and 2)
Respondents' failure to pay off the contract in full, having
accelerated all payments, constitutes a material breach.
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
Respondents filed a declaratory judgment action
with the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah, seeking, among other things, a declaration that the
Respondent C & J Industries, Inc., be permitted to continue
to make monthly payments under the contract as originally
agreed and that the facts of the case did not operate to
accelerate all future payments to become immediately due and
owing.

Appellants filed an answer to the Complaint, but did

not counterclaim.
Inasmuch as there is no dispute of fact in this
case, each party filed a motion for summary judgment.
The issues and law were extensively briefed.

Res-

pondents filed a Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment (TR. 30-39) and Plaintiffs' Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (TR. 57·1
Appellants filed a Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motio:
for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (TR. 70-76), and
Memorandum (TR. 77-83).
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On !'1ay 21, 1979, both Plaintiffs' and Defendants'
motions were heard by the Honorable Christine M. Durham.
The court reviewed the initial memorandums cf law filed in
support of the motions, and concluded that the parties should
be provided an opportunity to research and brief the law regarding an additional issue not addressed in the initial memorandums,
that issue being:

"Does a Uniform Real Estate Contract constitute

a sale of real. property or an executory contract to consummate
a sale?"
Both parties submitted memorandum of law with respect
to this additional issue.

On August 6, 1979, the court entered

its order granting Plaintiffs-Respondents' motion for summary
judgment and denying Defendants-Appellants' motion for summary
judgment and motion for attorney fees.

It is from this decision

that Defendants-Appellants now take this appeal.
Defendants-Appellants do not make any specific assignments of error on appeal.

It is assumed, however, that their

position is either that the court erred in its interpretation
of the law as it applied to the contract in question or that,
having interpreted the law correctly, misapplied it to the facts.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the decision of the lower
court reversed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about April 13, 1978, Respondent C

&

J Indus'

Inc., entered into a real estate contract for the purchase ft
Appellants of 11 lots of real property, more particularly
described in the contract which is Exhibit "A" to the Cornplai
(TR. 6-9).
Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Respondent
C

&

J Industries, Inc., has made monthly installment payment:

of $2, 297. 31 commencing June 1, 1978, and through and includi
the present date.

The purchase price is $220,000.00 plus

interest at 9-1/2 per cent per annum.

In addition to the

monthly payments, made prior to Plaintiffs' motion for sununar
judgment (totalling $27, 567. 72) , Plaintiffs-Respondents have
also invested approximately $4,000.00 in improvements to the
subject property.
On or about March 9, 1979, Respondents sold a smaL
portion of the property (i.e., 3 of 11 lots) to a third part;
for a total purchase price of $166,700.00, payable $15,000.m
down and the balance of $15l,OOO.OO plus interest at 10 per
cent per annum over an eight-year period in installments of
$2,300.00 per month.

Appellants contend that this transfer operated to
accelerate all future payments under the primary contract.
Appellants further contend that Respondents' failure to pay(
the contract (the outstanding balance of which is approximat<
$213,000.00) constitutes a material breach thereof.
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Paragraph 3(a) reads as follows:
In the event Buyer desires to sell or
assign, ~ransfer or convey Buyer's rights
under this contract or Buyer's interest
in said premises, then and in that event,
the Buyer must pay in full the outstanding
balance on the contract prior to said
transaction.
Some time in April of 1979, and after the transaction
to which Appellants object, Appellants served upon Respondents
a notice entitled "Notice to Reinstate the Terms of the
Contract to Purchase by Payment of All Delinquent Amounts Due
and owing By Virtue of the Sale of Property Subject to Said
Contract or Forfeit All Rights Under Said Contract."
ARGUHENT
I

A UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT CONSTITUTES
A PROMISE TO CONVEY, TRANSFER, SELL OR
ASSIGN, BUT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A PRESENT
SALE, ASSIGNMENT, TRANSFER OR CONVEYANCE.
The law holds that a purchase-money real estate contract such as the one between these parties (TR. 6-9) is an
executory contract for a sale.

It does not constitute a present

sale, and, therefore, does not trigger the acceleration of
the contract pursuant to Paragraph 3(a) thereof, and Respondents'
refusal to pay off the total outstanding balance of the contract
does not constitute a breach thereof.
The issue with respect to this particular aspect of
the case is whether a Uniform Real Estate Contract constitutes
a sale of real property or an executory contract to consummate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

a sale.

6 -

The focal point of that issue is:

"What is a sale:

In that regard, reference can usually be made to Black's Lai
Dictionary where we find the following definitions:
A contract between two parties called,
respectively, the "seller" (or vendor)
and the "buyer" (or purchaser), by which
the former, in consideration of the payment or promise of payment of a certain
price of money, transfers to the latter,
the title and possession of property.
Butler v. Thomson, 92 U.S. 414; 23 L.Ed.
684. In re Franks Estate, 277 N.Y.S. 573,
154 Misc. 472 [other citations omitted.]
A contract whereby property is transferred
from one person to another for a consideration of value, implying the passin~ of a
general and absolute title, as distinguished
from a special interest falling short of
complete ownership. Arnold v. North American Chemical Co., 232 Mass. 196, 122 N.E.
283, 284; Falkner v. Town of South Boston,
140 Va. 517, 127 S .E. 380, 381. (Emphasis
added.) Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed.,
p. 1503.
In short, it is obvious that a sale constitutes tl.
transfer of absolute title.

In 67 Am.Jur. 2d, "Sale",

we find a similar statement.
A sale has been distinguished from a contract to sell. The latter was considered
a contract whereby the seller agreed to
transfer the property and goods to the
buyer for consideration called the price.
It has been said that under the Uniform
Sales Act "a sale" implied and involved
passing of title. Accordingly, there has
been a material distinction between a
sale and a mere executory contract for a
sale. In the case of the former transaction,
the title to the goods passed to the buyer;
in the case of the latter, it remained with
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the seller. When an executory contract for
a sale was performed with respect to the
transfer of title, there was said to be a
sale or an executed contract for sale.
The transfer of title as the essential element
of sale is a principle of law of such an elementary nature
that the courts have not addressed it on frequent occasion.
The Utah Supreme Court expressed the principle 36 years ago
in Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 Ut.
135, 170 P. 2d 164 (1943). when it observed: "The essence
of a sale is the transfer of title to goods from the seller
to the buyer [citations omitted]."
Although the foregoing two references deal with the
definition of a "sale" in the context of the transfer of title
to goods, the principle is the same with respect to real property.
By its own terms, a uniform real estate contract does
not permit the transfer of title from the seller to the buyer
until all of the terms of the contract are performed and all
of the payments contemplated by the contract are made. Paragraph
19 of the secondary contract (TR. 10-11) states:
The Seller on receiving the payments herein
reserved to be paid at the time and in the
manner above-mentioned, agrees to execute
and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good
and sufficient warranty deed conveying the
title to the above-described premises free
and clear of encumbrances ••
In addition to the fact that there has been no transfer
of title from Respondents a third party of the real property
here in question, it is also helpful to consider the other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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language of the contract (TR. 10-11). For example, Paragraph
2 states:
That Seller, for the consideration herein
mentioned, agrees to sell and convey to
the buyer, and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned, agrees to purchase
the following described real property . • .
(Emphasis added.)
It is noteworthy that the language does not state·
"the Seller hereby sells and conveys to the Buyer, and the
hereby purchases the following described real property".

B.

Th!

language is prospective.
Again, turning to Black's Law Dictionary, we find
the following:

An executory sale is one which has been
definitely agreed on as to terms and conditions which have not yet been carried into
full effect in respect to some of its terms
and details, as where it remains to determine the price, quantity or identity of the
things sold, or to a installments of urchase money, or to effect a delivery. Citations omitted.]
(Emphasis added.) Black's
Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 1504. See also
Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press
Mfg, Co., 128 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1942).
Obviously, in this case the contract in question hi
not yet been carried into full effect as there remains the
obligation to pay installments of purchase money; consequent:
this contract constitutes an executory contract for the sale
as opposed to a completed sale.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 9 -

In the case of Noto v. Blasco, 198 So. 429 (1940),
the plaintiff entered into a contract to purchase three lots
of real property from Defendant.

Plaintiff made a partial

payment of $50.00 on the total contract price of $1,700.00.
Defendant later prevailed upon plaintiff to release him from
his contract to sell the lots.

Plaintiff alleged that he

was induced to release the contract on account of fraudulent
misrepresentations of the defendant.

He prayed for damages

in an amount equal to the difference between his contract
price and the higher price for which the property was sold
by the defendant shortly after plaintiff gave his release.
The court concluded that if the contract between the parties
constituted a sale, then plaintiff could recover the benefit
of his bargain (i.e., the difference between his contract and
the contract by which the property ultimately sold).

On the

other hand, in the event the contract was not a sale but only
a promise to sell, the plaintiff could only recover the partial
payments made by him.

Regarding this issue, the court

stated,
An agreement for the sale of real estate,
which contemplates the passing of the
property (or title) not immediately and
by virtue of the agreement, but by an
act to be executed at a later date, and
which contains all of the elements of the
sale, such as the price, the property and
the consent of the parties, is merely a
promise of sale, unless the intention of
the parties clearly indicates that the
agreement itself constitutes a completed
sale.
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As there was no completed sale, and as the
parties contemplated the completion of the
sale in the future by the execution of a
deed transferring the ownership, the contract in this case, according to the following cases, must be construed as a contract
or promise of sale and not a completed sale,
and the amount deposited must be considered
as earnest money, and the purchaser limited
to the recovery of the earnest money.
[Citations omitted.] Ibid 432.
The third party contract (TR. 10-11) is an executor
contract which contemplates the passing of title eight years
hence when all of the terms of the contract shall be complet!
Until that time, there has been no sale, and the acceleration
clause of Paragraph 3(a) of the primary contract does not
beccome operative under the facts of this case.
The foregoing argument applies primarily to the
operational effect of Paragraph 3(a) as it relates to the
transaction between Respondents and a third party (TR. 1011).

Appellants, however, have raised a new issue and a new

argument on appeal.

Appellants argue that,

The court must assume a sale, assignment
or conveyance of C & J Industries, Inc.'s
rights or interests to Glade N. James and
A. Robert Collins in order for them to
enter the contract executed by them on
March 9, 1979 (Exhibit "B" p. 10). If
there was a sale, assignment or conveyance by C & J Industries, Inc., to Glade
N. James and A. Robert Collins, then it
was a breach of Paragraph 3(a). Appellants'
Brief, 8.
This argument is not one which Respondents now
address because it was not plead, argued or subrni tted in anY
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The Court has repeatedly held

and recognized that it will not consider a matter raised for
the first time on appeal.

Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405

(Ut. 1977); State by and through Road Commission v. Larkin,
27 Ut. 2d 295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Ut.2d
358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967); Hamilton v. Salt Lake County Sewerage
Improvement District No. 1, 15 Ut.2d, 260 P.2d 235 (1964);
Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Ut.2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1962i;
Carson v. Douglas, 12 Ut.2d 424, 367 P.2d 462 (1962).
II

EVEN IF THE THIRD PARTY CONTRACT TRANSACTION
IN THIS CASE WERE CONSIDERED TO BE A PRESENT
SALE, THE TRANSFER OF A SMALL PORTION OF THE
TOTAL REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE PRIMARY
CONTRACT DOES NOT ACCELERATE PAYMENTS UNDER
THE CONTRACT OR VIOLATE THE PROVISIONS OF
PARAGRAPH 3(a) THEREOF.
As mentioned, Paragraph 3(a) requires the buyer
to pay off the contract in full in the event the buyer desires
to transfer "Buyer's rights" under the contract.

It is

Respondents' contention and understanding the the broad language in question requires the contract to be paid in full in
the event the buyer transfers all its rights under the
contract.

Appellants, on the other hand maintain that the

language imposes an obligation to pay off the contract if
any of the buyer's rights were transferred or any of the
property sold, however small.
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The construction of the language in contracts requ:
that the words be given their ordinary meaning, i.e., the
meaning which they would convey to reasonable men.

17

Arn.Jui

"Contracts" §§243, 247.
Stated in slightly different words, the
language and acts of a party to a contract
are to receive such a construction as at
the time he supposed the other party would
given to them or such a construction as
the other party was fairly justified in
giving to them and he will not at a later
time be permitted to give them a different
o eration in conse uence of some mental
reservation. §248:641 Emphasis added •
The words "Buyer's rights" without specific limitation or reservation denote the meaning of "all rights".
Normally, words are thought to describe the whole unless oth;
wise stated.

A granter, for example, is said to convey all

property described in the document of conveyance unless a Pfil
cular portion thereof is specifically reserved.

Similarly,

"Buyer's rights" reasonably means all rights possessed by th;
buyer unless more narrowly or specifically defined.

Had the

parties agreed to a more narrow term in this regard, it wouli
have been a simple and logical matter to have stated,
In the event Buyer desires to sell or
assign, transfer or convey any of Buyer's
rights under this contract or Buyer's
interest in said premises, then and in
that event the Buyer must pay in full
the outstanding balance due on this
contract prior to said transaction.
(Additional words underlined.)
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The interpretation placed upon this language by
Appellants flies in the teeth of reasonableness. Appellants
maintain that the term in question would be violated and
consequently a material breach of the contract would result
upon the transfer or conveyance of any right of the buyer,
however small or insignificant.

This would require the payment

of the entire unpaid balance of the contract if the buyer
were to convey to a neighboring property owner a one-foot
strip on which the neighbor could place a fence.

Such an

interpretation is not reasonable and does not serve the purpose
it was originally designated to accommodate.
Although Respondents believe that the language in
question is clear and denotes "all" of buyer's rights under
the contract, Respondents also contend, in the alternative,
that at the very worst the language is ambiguous.

Assuming

ambiguity for the sake of argument, the ambiguous language
must be construed strictly against the drafter -- in this
case it is the Appellants.
Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 28 Ut.2d 231, 500 P.2d
1007 (1972) was an action by the seller of real property
against the buyers for recovery of the balance due on the contract
price which seller had declared "immediately due and payable"
on the ground that buyers were in default.

The court stated

that forfeiture is not favored in the law and that the buyers
were entitled to the most favorable interpretation that
could beSponsored
placed
forfeiture
provision
by anda Library
person
by the S.J. upon
Quinney Lawthe
Library. Funding
for digitization provided
by the Institute of Museum
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of ordinary intelligence and understanding, and in light
of existing circumstances.

In ruling against the seller, tht

court applied the general rule of law that the provisions of
the contract should be construed most strictly against the
party who drafted the contract.
N.A. v. Midwest Realty

&

See also Wells Fargo Bank

Finance, Inc., 544 P.2d 882 (1975):

Wagstaff v. Reinco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931 (1975).
In this particular instance, Appellants, or their
attorney, drafted the contract in question, and therefore, it
provisions (in particular Paragraph 3 (a) ) should be construei
strictly against them and resolved in favor of Respondents,
declaring the language to refer to the transfer of all buyer'
rights.
Appellants contend in their brief that they do not
seek a forfeiture in this case; it should be noted, however,
that as previously mentioned the Appellants served upon Res·
pendents a Notice to Reinstate Terms of Contract to Purchase
by Payment of All Delinquent Amounts Due and Owing by Virtue
of the Sale of the Property Subject to said Contract or ~
All Rights Under Said Contract.

(Emphasis added.)

Furtherm:

in the event the payments under the primary contract were
accelerated and Respondents were required to pay off the out·
standing balance (approximately $213,000.00), it could well
be that Respondents would be unable to pay off the outstand·
ing balance, in which case Appellants' only viable remedy woul
be to seek a forfeiture.
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III

EVEN TAKING APPELLANTS' POSITION THAT
RESPONDEN'l'S BREACHED THE CONTRACT, THE
"BREACH" WAS OF l>. MINOR NATURE AND DOES
NOT EQUITABLY JUSTIFY AN ACCELERATION.
It is a well established principle of law that
although a minor breach gives rise to an immediate cause of
action for damages caused by the breach, it does not give rise
to a cause of action for breach of the entire contract as
urged by the Appellants.

Viewing this principle from another

perspective -- from the point of view of what has been done
under the contract as opposed to what was not done -- the
same principle is expressed as the doctrine of "substantial
performance" which is simply the mirror image of the "minorbreach doctrine."

It looks to the spirit of the contract

and not the letter of it.
The question is not whether there has been a literal
compliance, but whether there has been a substantial performance.
This has long been the rule in equity.

Accordingly, substantial

and not exact performance accompanied by good faith is all the
law requires in the case of any contract to entitle a party
to recover on it.
Although a plaintiff is not absolutely free
from fault or omission in every particular, the
court will not turn him away if he has in good
faith made substantial performance, but will
enforce his rights on the one hand and preserve the rights of the defendant on the other,
by permitting a recoupment. 17 Am.Jur.2d
"Contracts" §375:818.
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This rule of law prevents the inequities of forfei
preservin~

where there has been substantial compliance while

the injured party's right to recover damages for the minor
breach.

It is important to note, however, that Appellants

have not been damaged in any degree as a result of the
contract to sell the three lots.
The question now becomes:

"What is 'substantial

performance' , or what constitutes a 'minor breach'?"

The

answer is provided by the Restatement of the Law of Contract
§275, pp. 402, 403.

The Restatement lists six factors to be

taken into consideration in determining whether a breach is
material or minor in nature.

The text of §275 is:

In determining the materiality of a failure
to fully perform a promise, the following
circumstances are influential.
(a) The extent to which the injured party
will obtain the substantial benefit which
he would have reasonably anticipated; • • •
Appellants as sellers of the property are entitled
primarily to receive payment for their property in the amoun·
and at the intervals set forth in the contract ($220,000.00
at $2,297.31 per month with 9-1/2 per cent interest).
benefit has not been interrupted and is secure.

That

It has not

been jeopardized in the least as a result of the alleged
"breach" of which Appellants complain.
(b) The extent to which the injured party
may be adequately compensated in damages
for lack of complete performance; . • • Id.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 17 -

Here again, while Appellants may argue that they have
a cause of action for the contract to sell three lots, they
have not been damaged in the least as a result thereof.
(c) The extent to which the party failing
to perform has already performed or made
preparations for performance. Id.
The official comments to §275 state that,
[W]here the failure is at the outset, a
very slight failure is often sufficient to
discharge the injured party. But even in
that case, and more obviously if the failure
of a promissor occurs after part performance
by him, the question becomes one of degree.
Both the amount that he has done and the
benefit that the injured party has received
are to be considered. Id. 403.
In this instance there has been substantial performance.

Respondents have faithfully made the payments re-

quired by the contract, not to mention some $45,000.00
invested in inprovements on the property.
(d) The greater or lesser hardship on the
party failing to perform and terminating
the contract; • • • Id.
In this regard the official comments are as follows:
The question then to be answered is: Will
it be more conformable to justice in the
particular case to free the injured party
[of the contract] or, on the other hand,
to require him to perform his promise, in
both cases giving him a right of action
if the failure to perform was wrongful.
Id. 403.
As indicated before, Respondents will suffer a
severe hardship in having to pay the outstanding balance on
the contract (presently approximately $213,000.00), which
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constitutes the price for all 11 lots because Respondents
sold 3 of them.

The hardship becomes especially onerous by

the fact that the proceeds from the 3-lot sale are not in
hand but are to be received by contract over a period of
8 years.

Also, there would be a substantial charge to

Respondents for increased rates of interest of Respondents
have to borrow money to pay off the $213,000.00.
In the event Respondents cannot obtain adequate
financing to pay off the contract, Appellants will suffer
the property to be foreclosed by judicial sale or forfeiture
and Respondents will stand to lose most or all of their inve
ment.
(e) The willful, negligent or innocent
behavior of the party failing to perform;.
Id.
In the present instance, Respondents never underst
nor do they now understand or believe, that the contract in
question required them to pay off the outstanding balance
in the event any portion of the property, however small,
were sold to a third party.

Certainly it cannot be said tha·

the contract to sell 3 lots to a third party was a willful
contravention of the primary contract.
(f) The greater or lesser uncertainty that
the party failing to perform will perform
the remainder of the contract. Id.
Respondents have faithfully performed their obli·
gations under the contract to date and will continue to do
so in the future.
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It is clear from the foregoing principles that the
alleged wrong is not material to the contract.

Appellants

stand to receive the full benefit bargained for under the contract; they have not been damaged as a result of the alleged
wrong; Respondents have substantially performed and would incur
great hardship if the contract were terminated by the acceleration of payments; the contract to sell 3 lots in question
was not done in willful disregard of the terms of the primary
contract; and there exists no uncertainty as to the prospect
of future performance by Respondents.
In Krentz v. Johnson, 343 N.E.2d 165 (Ill. C.A., 1976),
the court considered an action by purchasers of real property
seeking specific performance of the contract which had been
declared forfeited by sellers for a default of a single payment.
The court observed that the sum of $11,000.00 plus interest had
been paid on the original contract price of $27,500.00.

The

buyers had also made substantial improvements on the property
and had affected re-zoning of the entire property showing
expenditures in the amount of $22,500.00.
amounted to $182.81.
close the contract.

The default declared

On that basis, sellers attempted to foreThe court stated,

It has been stated generally, as defendants
contend, that where a forfeiture has been
declared in the manner prescribed in the
contract the court will give effect to it.
[Citations omitted.] It would appear,
however, that the cases give effect to this
rule when the result is not essentially
unfair to either party. The equally
familiar rule is that forfeitures are not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 20 -

favored by courts of equity and that parties
will be relieved from a technical forfeiture
of rights under a contract if injustice
results from its enforcement.
Another case dealing with the same principle is
Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis v. Williamson,
545 F.2d 76 (8th Cir., 1976).

This case involved two corpor·

ations, one of which acquired the other.

The acquired

company amended its employee pension trust so as to require
assets to the trust to be transferred to the acquiring compai
The acquiring company agreed to make all former employees of
the acquired company eligible to participate in the new
company's plan.

Obviously, the intent was to benefit the

acquired company's former employees.

The acquiring company,

however, did not fully comply in that it included only 112 of
117 employees of the former company in its own pension plan.

The court found that the new company had "substantially
performed" its obligation to include the former employer's
employees in its own pension plan and, therefore, refused
to deprive the new company of the entire fund.
As in Krentz and Northwestern National, supra, the
Respondents in this case have substantially performed all
of their obligations under the contract in queston; therefore, the contract should be enforced to allow them to
continue to make regular monthly payments for the purchase
of the property and to retain the possession, use and enjoyirt·
thereof pursuant to the terms of the contract.
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IV
APPELLANTS' POSITION WOULD WORK AN UNCONSCIONABLE RESULT TO RESPONDENTS' INTEREST.

Appellants maintain that "according to value", 75 per
cent of the property sold by Appellants to Respondents has now
been sold by Respondents to a third party.
p. 21.

Appellants' Brief,

That assertion is fallacious in that it compares apples

with oranges.

Appellants are comparing the contract price

between these parties with the contract price between Respondents
and the third party.

The fact is that only 3 of the 11 lots

involved are the subject of the second contract.

Appellants'

position is also blind to the fact that Respondents have not
received a lump sum of money in hand but that the contract price
is to be paid out over a period of time (8 years).
Contrary to Appellants' assertion that no claim of
unconscionability has been raised (Appellants' Brief, p. 21),
Respondents argued in each memorandum submitted below that
they will suffer a severe hardship in having to pay the
outstanding balance on the contract (approximately $213,000.00),
which constitutes the price for all 11 lots.

That burden

becomes more onerous by the fact that there would be a substantial charge to Respondents for the now higher rates of
interest that Respondents would have to pay in order to obtain
sufficient financing to pay off the contract.
Appellants' position is simply untenable.

At the

outset, they have asserted that Paragraph 3(a) of the contract
bet\veen these
would
require
Respondents
toandpay
off
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the entire unpaid balance of the contract if they were to se
to a third party any portion of the 11 lots in question.

Gi

that interpretation, if the Respondents were to sell a one·f'.
parcel of any of the property, the acceleration would operat:
Appellants have now taken the argument an addition:
step further.

With respect to the language of Paragraph 3(a

which states in part that:

"In the event Buyer desires to

Si

assign, transfer or convey Buyer's rights. • • " Appellants
now claim that the acceleration clause is triggered the momi:
the Respondents thought of the idea of selling the property:
any portion thereof to a third party.

Thus, not only must

Respondents pay the full contract price in the event they se
any portion of the property, they must do so the moment the
idea pops into their heads.

It simply cannot be said that

such an interpretation is reasonable or remotely similar to
what the parties contemplated when they entered into these
transactions.

v
APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING
RESPONDENTS' ALLEGED "BREACH".
It is widely recognized that a default in the
performance of the contract may be waived and the injured
party may accept or insist on performance after such breach
of the contract.

"The acceptance of the benefit under the

contract with the knowledge of a breach thereof ordinarily
constitutes a waiver of the wrong."

17 Am.Jur.2d "Contract!
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After Respondents received Appellants' 30-day notice
of termination and cancellation of the contract, Appellants
continued to demand that the subsequent monthly payments be
made.

Respondents complied; they have made all regular monthly

payments to date as demanded and accepted by Appellants.
Respondents urge, therefore, that Appellants have elected
to continue to accept performance by Respondents according
to the terms of the contract and have thereby waived their
right to assert the .alleged breach of contract arising out
of the contract to sell the 3 lots to the third party,
VI

APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD
FOR ATTORNEY FEES.
Appellants maintain that they are entitled to an
award for attorney fees arising out of the present action.
Appellants' petition for attorney fees should be denied on
the basis of any one or all of the following reasons:
1.

There has been no event of default or breach

on the part of Respondents under the terms of the contract
between these parties.

In this regard, reference should be

made not only to the arguments set forth in the briefs,
but also to those set forth in the memorandums filed in support
of the motions for summary judgment heard below.
2.

Appellants failed to file a counterclaim

seeking affirmative relief which would have provided the
basis for seeking an award of attorney fees.
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3.

Appellants have maintained throughout these

proceedings that it is an action to enforce a contract and
not an action for breach and forfeiture.

For the purpose

of this argument, assuming that there has been a "sale" as
contemplated by Paragraph 3 (a) of the primary contract, such
a "sale" would not constitute a default.

It would merely tri

acceleration of payments, a term of the contract.

Respondent

however, maintain that no event has occurred which constitute
a "sale" or which would accelerate payments under the primari
contract in any event.
4.

This is an action for a declaratory judgment

and not one for affirmative relief.
CONCLUSION
The provisions of Paragraph 3(a) of the primary
contract have

not been violated by Respondents.

There has

been no sale of property.
Even assuming that a Uniform Real Estate Contract
were construed to be a consummated sale, still there has been
no violation of Paragraph 3 (a) because that provision does nc
contemplate the conveyance, sale or transfer of simply a smal
portion of the "Buyer's rights".

Reasonably constructed,

that paragraph leads one to conclude that it relates to the
transfer, sale or conveyance of all of "Buyer's rights".
At the very worst, Paragraph 3(a) is ambiguous as
to its intent and must be construed strictly against the
Appellants inasmuch as they are the drafters of the contract.
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Even if one assumes further that Paragraph 3(a) is
triggered by the conveyance, sale or transfer of any portion of
the subject real property, Respondents have substantially performed all of their obligations under the contract, and under
the "minor-breach doctrine", the alleged wrong is not material to the contract.
Although a minor breach would give rise to an immediate cause of action for damages (which are nil in this case),
it does not give rise to a cause of action for breach of the
entire contract as urged by the Appellants.

Appellants stand

to receive the full benefit bargained for under the contract;
they have not been damaged as a result of the alleged wrong;
Respondents have substantially performed and would incur great
hardship if the contract were terminated by the acceleration
of payments; and there exists no uncertainty as to the prospect
of future performance by Respondents.
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully
petition this court to affirm the decision of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
JENSEN &
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Attorneys for Respondents
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I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the
foregoing Respondents' Brief to T. Quentin Cannon, Attorney
for Appellants, 510 Ten Broadway Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah, this 13th day of December, 1979, postage prepaid.
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